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Abstract 
Despite international regulations that prohibit the trans-boundary movement of 
electronic and electric waste (e-waste), non-reusable e-waste is often illegally mixed with 
reusable e-waste and results in being sent to developing countries. As developing countries 
are not well prepared to properly manage e-waste, this illegal trade has important negative 
externalities, and creates ‘environmental injustice’. The two main information problems on 
the e-waste market are imperfect monitoring and imperfect information on the so-called 
‘degree of purity’ of the e-waste. In this paper, we use a simple bilateral North-South trade 
model and show that there exists an alternative e-waste market that is better than the 
standard e-waste market for developing countries. This alternative e-waste market is a joint 
trade in reusable and non-reusable e-waste. In both cases, we consider demand and supply 
sides, plus the equilibrium of the e-waste market to show that the alternative market that we 
propose is better for developing countries.  
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Abstract 
Despite international regulations that prohibit the trans-boundary movement of 
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model and show that there exists an alternative e-waste market that is better than the 
standard e-waste market for developing countries. This alternative e-waste market is a joint 
trade in reusable and non-reusable e-waste. In both cases, we consider demand and supply 
sides, plus the equilibrium of the e-waste market to show that the alternative market that we 
propose is better for developing countries.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Around the world, 48.9 million tons of electronic waste (e-waste1) was generated in 
2012, which corresponds to 19.6 kg per capita (StEP-UN, 2013). The growth of e-waste is 
estimated to reach 3-5% a year, a rate that is nearly three times that of conventional waste 
(UNEP, 2005). A comparative advantage in terms of labour, disparities in environmental 
regulations together with an imperfect monitoring system favour the e-waste trade between 
rich and poor countries. As developing countries are not well prepared to properly manage e-
waste, the illegal trade of e-waste has important negative externalities and can be seen as 
‘environmental injustice’. In this paper, we show that the alternative e-waste market of joint 
trade in both non-reusable and reusable e-waste is better for developing countries. 
Stringent environmental regulations in developed countries, together with a low 
purchasing power of consumers in developing countries, create incentives for the e-waste 
trade. Within the context of the increasing growth of e-waste throughout the world and facing 
high disposal costs in developed countries,2 firms in rich countries can decide to invest in 
green design by increasing the level of reusability of their product (Bernard, 2015). The firms 
in rich countries can also sell to industries that reuse e-waste (Higashida, 2012). As the 
monitoring system is imperfect, the latter option is often chosen. In fact, the e-waste market is 
regulated by a range of international regulations such as the Basel Convention, WEEE 
Directives,3 the Bamako Convention, etc. If firms really are complying with international 
regulations, there will be no possibility that firms from rich countries could export the non-
reusable parts of e-waste to less developed countries. Unfortunately, this is not the case 
because e-waste is often shipped back to their countries of origin by the customs officers of 
importing countries due to illegally traded products (Higashida, 2012). For instance, in Hong 
Kong between 2006 and 2008, 291 imported shipments of controlled electronic waste were 
returned to their countries of origin (Kojima et al., 2011). Illegal shipment occurs not only 
because international regulations are weak, but also because it is difficult to identify non-
reusable e-waste.4 Hence, the two main information problems that are related to the e-waste 
market are imperfect monitoring and imperfect information on the so-called ‘degree of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  There	  is	  no	  standard	  definition	  of	  e-­‐waste.	  The	  term	  e-­‐waste	  is	  generally	  used	  for	  all	  types	  of	  electrical	  and	  
2	  In	  the	  1980’s,	  the	  average	  disposal	  costs	  for	  one	  ton	  of	  hazardous	  waste	  in	  Africa	  was	  between	  US$2.50-­‐$50,	  
and	  in	  industrialized	  countries	  $100-­‐	  $2,000	  (Kummer,	  1995).	  
3	  Waste	  Electrical	  and	  Electronic	  Equipment	  (WEEE)	  Directives	  are	  the	  legislative	  framework	  within	  the	  
European	  Union	  (EU)	  (EC	  regulation	  N°	  1013/2006).	  
4	  For	  instance,	  it	  is	  very	  costly	  and	  time-­‐consuming	  to	  check	  a	  full	  container	  of	  second	  hand	  televisions	  to	  
ensure	  that	  they	  all	  constitute	  reusable	  e-­‐waste.	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purity’. These two problems create incentives for non-valuable e-waste to be sent to poor 
countries. The negative externalities due to the hazardous components of e-waste are serious 
because developing countries do not have the appropriate knowledge and/or tools to properly 
manage e-waste. 
Additionally, the mix of reusable with non-reusable e-waste can be seen as an indirect 
subsidy.  In fact, the exporting firm indirectly pays for the disposal service by lowering the 
price at which it sells the e-waste in developing countries. For example, the average price for 
all television sets exported drops from €339 to €28 when they are exported to Nigeria, Ghana 
or Egypt (Bernard, 2015). In this context, we ask the following questions: first, what are the 
factors that could explain the increase in non-reusable e-waste in developing countries; and 
second, does there exist any better alternative than monitoring the standard e-waste market to 
reduce the trade of non-reusable e-waste?  
E-waste issues are less studied in economics than in environmental engineering and 
chemistry. To our knowledge, Sen (1962) is the earliest contributor to the literature on the 
international trade in used goods. He analyzes the potential gains from the international trade 
in used goods that is based on the movement of used machinery from high to low labour cost 
countries. In the same vein, Smith (1976) and Bond (1983) model the gains that may create 
the comparative advantage between countries. This advantage may come from disparities in 
environmental regulations, labour cost or waste disposal technologies. For instance, trade in 
waste can be seen as trade in waste disposal services (Copeland, 1991). In this context, 
Copeland (1991) shows that it is optimally better to allow free trade in waste products. He 
suggests that this free trade must be combined with internal tax policies and regulations to 
control for the externalities, which are related to disposal. However, he points out that this 
policy may suffer from compliance or enforcement issues, and therefore may result in an 
increase of incentives for firms to evade taxes and regulations, and to dispose of their waste 
illegally. Clerides (2008) shows the same results based on asymmetric quality standards that 
reduce trade in new goods and generate negative impacts on domestic industry.  
The ‘pollution haven hypothesis’ (PHH) predicts that firms will relocate to 
jurisdictions with less stringent environmental regulations. A large body of evidence 
supporting the existence of PHH has been demonstrated by Baggs (2009), Kellenberg (2010), 
Bernard (2015), and Kinnaman & Yokoo (2011). An exception is Higashida et al. (2008) who 
use a gravity model, and show that the more developed a country, the more it imports 
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recyclable waste. Kellenberg (2010) focuses on the consumption side of pollution instead of 
the production side of externalities to emphasize the ‘waste havens hypothesis’. For Johnstone 
(1998), market and policy failures may explain the adverse economic and environmental 
effects of an introduction of a ban on trade in hazardous waste. Later on, Lipman (2011) 
shows that international regulations relating to the trans-boundary movement of hazardous 
waste under the Basel Convention are not able to protect developing countries.  
One of the main recommendations in the European Topic Centre’s report on 
Sustainable Consumption and Production (ETC/SCP)―trans-boundary shipments of waste in 
the European Union―is to study the choices and behaviour of waste producers/collectors. 
Notably, such a study could help to better understand the drivers of this trade in order to 
reduce their impact, and/or to adapt legislation. To our knowledge, only Bernard (2015) 
focuses on the strategies of e-waste producers to explore the driving forces for illegal waste 
trade. The analysis of the behaviour of collectors will be an important issue in this paper. 
In this paper, we use a simple bilateral North-South trade model, and show that there 
exists an alternative better than the standard e-waste market for developing countries. This 
model is close to that of Bernard (2015), and considers one representative firm in the North 
and one representative firm in the South. Our contribution is four-fold. First, it seems more 
realistic to analyze collectors' behaviours than producers' behaviours, as it is through 
collectors that producers participate in the e-waste market. Collectors can collect e-waste 
mainly from households, companies or in the second-hand goods market. Second, we 
consider that at the moment the collectors are collecting the e-waste, they do not know which 
part of the waste constitutes reusable e-waste. However, after collecting the e-waste, the 
collector can decide to invest in sorting, and to separate the reusable waste from the non-
reusable waste. Third, before exporting, the collector has incentives to mix additional non-
reusable e-waste that is illegally provided by companies in charge of disposing e-waste in 
their country of origin, which are willing to pay for the disposal cost in the North. In the case 
where the collector does not invest in sorting, he participates in the standard market. The non-
reusable e-waste can probably be detected as illegal by international monitoring systems and 
returned to the country of origin. The collector in this case has to pay a fine, and can 
participate in the alternative market that we propose by investing in the sorting process. The 
alternative e-waste market is a joint trade in reusable and non-reusable e-waste without a 
monitoring system.  
5	  
	  
The fourth is our main finding. We show that, first, firms in the North are willing to pay to 
get rid of their non-reusable e-waste, while firms in the South are willing to get compensation 
for disposal services. This creates incentives for a trade in disposal services. Second, in the 
alternative market without a monitoring system, the quantity of non-valuable e-waste is lower 
than that in the standard market at a higher price of reusable e-waste. Thus, it can be a better 
option for firms in the South to adopt the alternative e-waste market, which would result in 
more reusable e-waste and less non-reusable e-waste, with compensation for disposal 
services. Third, we also show that if the standard e-waste market has to persist, only a very 
high marginal penalty will constrain firms in the North from mixing both types of e-waste. 
Another important issue is the implementation of this alternative market. Firms in developing 
countries need to induce firms in the North to invest in sorting, and to truthfully reveal the 
degree of purity. This implementation issue requires incentives theory together with 
information learning mechanisms that can be applied to the Principal-Agent framework. This 
issue is explored in Dato (2014). 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The model is described in Section 
2. In Section 3, we analyze the case of no investment in sorting, while Section 4 is devoted to 
the case of investment in sorting with participation in the alternative e-waste market. We 
compare both cases in Section 5. The comparative statics are presented in Section 6. Finally, 
Section 7 concludes. 
2. The model 
We propose the following framework to describe the e-waste market (Fig 1). We use a 
simple bilateral North-South trade model and consider one representative firm in the North 
and one representative firm in the South. This model is close to that of Bernard (2015), who 
uses green design strategies to explain the increase in the illegal shipment of e-waste. She 
considers that the firm in the North produces the new good and manages it at the end-of-life. 
The firm in this case can try to increase the level of reusability of the new good by 
incorporating the disposal cost of the e-waste at the end-of-life, or can decide to illegally ship 
the e-waste. In fact, most of the firms from developed countries that are involved in e-waste 
markets are collectors. The exporters are not the firms that produce the new goods, hence one 
may consider that their strategies might be different. Also, while trading, firms in the South 
do not know the exact degree of purity that is defined as the part of reusable second-hand 
products in the import.  
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Figure 1: Conceptual Framework 
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This degree of purity determines their decision to trade and the quantity of e-waste that 
they are willing to trade. In the North, the level of illegal e-waste they are willing to mix with 
the reusable e-waste depends on the monitoring system, which is headed by national 
authorities through the inspection of export (or import) materials. It is then important to 
account for the issue of imperfect information to analyze the e-waste market.  
The exporter in the North is, in general, a collector. He collects a quantity Q of e-waste in 
the home country through many means. He can collect e-waste from the company that has to 
renew their materials, from households, from the second-hand goods market in his home 
country, etc. In order to collect and export e-waste, it costs CN(α,Q) for the firm in the North. 
The cost function is increasing in the quantity of e-waste Q that is collected, and the marginal 
cost is high when the part of reusable α is high. The cost function is convex in the level of 
export, and the marginal cost is increasing in the degree of purity α. After collecting e-waste, 
the firm can decide to invest in sorting and to separate the reusable part αQ from the non-
reusable part (1-α)Q. This investment costs C(Q). If the collector decides not to invest in 
sorting, he will not be able to know the degree of purity α. 
Before exporting, the firm has incentives to mix additional non-reusable e-waste D, that is 
illegally provided by companies in charge of disposing e-waste in their home country. These 
companies are willing to pay for the disposal cost in the North dN. In the case where the 
collector does not invest in sorting, he supplies the quantity of e-waste X in the standard 
market. The quantity X is the sum of the quantity of collected e-waste Q and the additional 
non-reusable e-waste D. Then, both types of e-waste are mixed and sold to the firm in the 
South at the price Pe. The non-reusable part in the export is (1-q) = [(1-α)Q + D]/X, with q the 
degree of purity of export.5 The non-reusable e-waste (1-q)X has probability σ to be detected 
as illegal by the international monitoring system and returned to the home country. The firm 
in this case has to pay a fine F(q,X) which is increasing in the non-reusable part. On the 
contrary, we propose an alternative e-waste market that we define as a joint trade in reusable 
and non-reusable e-waste without a monitoring system. This alternative e-waste market holds 
if and only if the collector decides to invest in sorting. If he does so, he is able to separate the 
two types of e-waste and supply to the alternative e-waste market. The reusable part αQ is 
sold at a price P1, and the non-reusable part (1-α)Q +D is sold at a price P0 and he bears a 
sorting cost C(Q). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  Note	  that	  the	  degree	  of	  purity	  of	  the	  export	  is	  different	  from	  that	  of	  the	  collected	  e-­‐waste	  because	  of	  the	  
additional	  e-­‐waste	  D.	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The firm in the South under imperfect information pays Pe to the firm in the North for both 
types of second-hand goods. It costs Cs(q,X) for the firm in the South to import and 
transform―even partially―the second-hand goods. The cost function is increasing in the 
quantity of import and the marginal cost is low when the reusable part is high. The cost 
function is convex in the level of import and the marginal cost is decreasing in the degree of 
purity. The firm in the North gains P for reselling the reusable part in the South and bears ds 
as the disposal cost that is related to the non-reusable part. However, the quantity of the non-
reusable e-waste that ends up in the South depends on the international monitoring system. In 
fact, at the moment the firm in the North decides to mix illegal and legal second-hand goods, 
the firm in the North does not know for certain whether the export will be inspected or not. In 
the case of the alternative e-waste market, the firm will pay P1 and P0 for reusable and non-
reusable e-waste respectively.  
Benefits and costs of the bilateral North-South trade model are summarized in Table 1. 
We use this framework to analyze the standard and the alternative markets of e-waste. First, 
we focus on the standard e-waste market that corresponds to the imperfect information on the 
degree of purity from the importer side. In this case, the firm in the North does not invest in 
sorting and supplies a mixed type of e-waste. Second, we analyze the case of perfect 
information on the degree of purity and on the monitoring system. This corresponds to the 
alternative e-waste market that we propose. The collector in the North invests in sorting, and 
supplies in a joint market of reusable and non-reusable e-waste, while the firm in the South 
demands the same joint market of reusable and non-reusable e-waste. We assume a joint trade 
of both types of e-waste to highlight the possibility of legally trading non-reusable e-waste, 
instead of illegally mixing it. Due to the comparative advantage in terms of labour, it may be 
optimal to treat e-waste in developing countries. A transfer of appropriate technologies that 
could help developing countries to properly dispose of e-waste could follow this joint market.  
Table1: Benefits and costs of the bilateral North-South model. 
Firms in North (Supply) Firms in South (Demand) 
Benefit Cost Benefit Cost 
 
Profit/ 
(NSI) 
 
[ ](1 ) (1 )e e NP Q P Q D d Dα σ α+ − − + +
 
( , ) ( , )NC Q F Q Dα σ+
	  
 
PqX 	  
[ ](1 )(1 )
( , ) (1 )(1 )
e
S S
q q P X
C q X d q X
σ
σ
+ − − +
+ − −
	  
 
 
Profit/ 
(SI) [ ]1 0 (1 ) NP Q P Q D d Dα α+ − + +  ( , ) ( )NC Q C Qα +  1PX  1 1 0 0 1 0( )S SPX P X C X d X+ + + 	  
 
 
 
………….	  Not	  considered	  in	  the	  model	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Considered	  in	  the	  model.	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3. No sorting investment 
We focus on the standard market that corresponds to the case of no investment in sorting. We 
study the market equilibrium that is given by demand and supply of e-waste. ΠNSIN  and Π
NSI
S  
denote the profit without investment in sorting for the collector in the North and that of the 
firm in the South, respectively. Both supply and demand are obtained by maximizing the two 
profits. We assume that firms and collectors are price takers in this model, in that they do not 
influence prices. In fact, many firms in the South are interested in e-waste as second-hand 
goods. In this way, several collectors in developed countries also have an incentive to get rid 
of their e-waste in order to avoid facing costly e-waste disposal.  
3.1. Supply (Collector in the North) 
The Collector in the North solves the following programme: 
 (S.1)          
maxΠNNSI = PeαQ+Pe(1−σ ) (1−α)Q+D[ ]−CN (α,Q)+ dND−σF(Q,D)
Q,D
 
(S.1) states that the collector optimally chooses the quantity of e-waste that he collects and the 
additional non-reusable e-waste that is mixed in order to get a maximum benefit net of 
expected costs. 
The first and second order conditions with respect to Q and D are given respectively by: 
(S.2)           ∂ΠN
NSI
∂Q = P
e α + (1−σ )(1−α)[ ]− ∂CN (α,Q)
∂Q −σ
∂F(Q,D)
∂Q = 0        
(S.3)             ∂ΠN
NSI
∂D = P
e(1−σ )−σ ∂F(Q,D)
∂D + dN = 0  
(S.4)            ∂
2ΠN
NSI
∂Q2 = −
∂2CN (α,Q)
∂Q2 −σ
∂2F(Q,D)
∂Q2 ≺ 0  
(S.5)             0),( 2
2
2
2
≺
D
DQF
D
NSI
N
∂
∂
−=
∂
Π∂
σ  
(S.2) and (S.3) are arbitrage conditions. The collector is indifferent between the 
expected additional gain from selling one additional unit of the collected e-waste or that of the 
additional non-reusable e-waste, and the expected additional costs. (S.4) and (S.5) are second 
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order conditions that ensure that the profit is maximal at the optimum levels of the collected 
e-waste and of the additional non-reusable e-waste. Due to the properties of CN
 
and of 
F(Q,D), (S.4) and (S.5) ensure that the profit function is concave in Q and D. Then, the first 
order conditions (FOC)―with respect to Q and D―lead to an optimum level of the collected 
e-waste Q*(Pe), and the optimal level of additional non-reusable e-waste D*(Pe). Hence the 
supply can be deduced as: Se= S(Pe)= Q* (Pe) + D*(Pe). 
3.2. Demand side (Firm in the South) 
The programme that solves the firm in the South is the following: 
 (D.1)          maxΠ
NSI
S   (q,X) = PqX −PeqX − (1−σ )(1− q)PeX −CS (q,X)− dS (1−σ )(1− q)X
X
 
As the firm in the South could not identify Q and D, it faces the whole package of e-waste. 
(S.1) states that the firm in the South optimally chooses the quantity of the mixed e-waste that 
provides a maximum expected benefit net of expected costs. 
The first and second order conditions with respect to X are given respectively by: 
(D.2)           ∂Π
NSI
S   
∂X = Pq− dS (1−σ )(1− q)−P
e q+ (1−σ )(1− q)[ ]− ∂CS (q,X)
∂X = 0             
(D.3)            ∂
2ΠNSIS   
∂X 2 = −
∂2CS (q,X)
∂X 2 ≺ 0  
(D.2) is also an arbitrage condition, and (D.3) ensures that the profit is maximal at the optimal 
level of X. Then, we can deduce the demand function as De= X(Pe). 
3.3. Market equilibrium 
By equalizing demand and supply (De=Se), we get the equilibrium level of trade X*. Using 
X*, we can calculate D* = X* - Q* and (1-q) = [(1-α)Q* + D*]/X*.  
From (S.2)-(D.2) and (S.3)-(D.2), we get the following equilibrium conditions: 
 (E.1)        ( , ) ( , )(1 )(1 ) ( , )(1 )(1 ) *
(1 )(1 )
S N
S
C q X C Qq q F Q DPq q d
X Q Q
ασ
σ σ
α σ α
⎡ ⎤∂ ∂+ − − ∂
− − − − = +⎢ ⎥∂ + − − ∂ ∂⎣ ⎦  
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and 
(E.2)        Pq− (1− q)(1−σ )dS −
∂CS (q,X )
∂X
=
q+ (1−σ )(1− q)
1−σ
* dN +σ
∂F (Q,D)
∂D
#
$
%
&
'
(.  
Both equilibrium conditions (E.1) and (E.2) state that the resale price in the South of one unit 
of the e-waste trade should be equal to the marginal costs (costs in the North and in the South, 
penalty from inspection) related to the trade, and the disposal costs that are adjusted by the 
probability of inspection and the degree of purity. The equilibrium conditions incorporate all 
of the parameters that are related to both sides of the e-waste trade and to the inspection. The 
effect of each parameter on the equilibrium price is not obvious. We perform comparative 
statistics in Section 6 on the above equilibrium conditions to deduce their effects.  
4. Sorting investment 
The sorting investment allows the collector to participate in the joint trade of the non-reusable 
and reusable e-waste markets. As before, we study the market equilibrium, and both supply 
and demand are obtained by maximizing the profit of each firm. ΠSIN  and Π
SI
S  are defined as 
the profit with investment in sorting by the collector in the North and the firm in the South, 
respectively. 
4.1. Supply (Collector in the North) 
The programme to be solved by the firm in the North is the following: 
            (S.6)              
maxΠSIN = P1αQ+P0 [ (1−α)Q+D ]−CN (α,Q)−C(Q)+ dND
Q,D
 
By denoting X1= αQ and X0= (1-α)Q+D, the quantity of the reusable e-waste and that of the 
non-reusable e-waste respectively is: 
maxΠSIN = P1X1 +P0X0 −CN (α,Q)−C(Q)+ dND
X0,X1
Subject     to   X1 =αQ   and    X0 = (1−α)Q+D
 
Implicitly, the collector chooses the quantity of reusable e-waste and that of non-reusable e-
waste that provides maximal profit on the joint e-waste market. 
The first order conditions are given by: 
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(S.7)           ∂Π
SI
N
∂X1
= P1 −
∂CN (α,Q)
∂Q *
∂Q
∂X1
−
∂C(Q)
∂Q *
∂Q
∂X1
+ dN *
∂D
∂X1
= 0        
(S.8)             ∂Π
SI
N
∂X0
= P0 −
∂CN (α,Q)
∂Q *
∂Q
∂X0
−
∂C(Q)
∂Q *
∂Q
∂X0
+ dN *
∂D
∂X0
= 0  
With 0   ;1
11
=
∂
∂
=
∂
∂
X
D
X
Q
α
; ∂Q
∂X0
=
1
1−α  and 
∂D
∂X0
=1 . 
 (S.7) and (S.8) become respectively: 
(S.9)           1
( , ) 1 ( ) 1* *NC Q C QP
Q Q
α
α α
∂ ∂
= +
∂ ∂
       
(S.10)             0
( , ) 1 ( ) 1* * 0
1 1
N
N
C Q C QP d
Q Q
α
α α
∂ ∂
+ = + =
∂ − ∂ −
 
(S.9) and (S.10) are arbitrage conditions with respect to the quantity of the reusable e-waste 
and to the non-reusable e-waste respectively. With Q*, we deduce S1= S1(P1) and S0= S0(P0), 
being the supply in the reusable e-waste and in the non-reusable e-waste, respectively. 
We claim on the supply side the following: 
Proposition 1: In the case of sorting investment, the price of non-reusable e-waste should be 
‘negative’; the firm in the North should pay to get rid of its non-reusable e-waste. 
§ Proof of Proposition 1: 
(S.9) is the well-known result of perfect competition. The price of the reusable e-waste 
is equal to its marginal cost. We can easily deduce the implicit supply function of the reusable 
e-waste as S1=S1(P1). This is indeed a supply function because: 
 
∂P1
∂X1
=
1
α 2
!"
∂2CN (α,Q)
∂Q2
+
∂2C(Q)
∂Q2
!"≻ 0 .  
Note that the price of reusable e-waste that is paid by firms in the South P1 is higher than the 
one in the North. If this condition does not hold, then firms in the North will prefer to sell in 
the home country and then the reusable e-waste market will break down. In general, the price 
of the reusable e-waste is low in the North due to the fact that consumers in the North have 
less interest in obsolete equipment. 
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(S.10) states that the marginal price of the non-reusable e-waste should be equal to the 
marginal cost, net of the payment received from additional non-reusable e-waste (dN). 
Likewise, we can deduce the implicit supply function of the non-reusable e-waste as S0 
=S0(P0) and 
∂P0
∂X 0
=
1
1−α
*!"
∂2CN (α,Q)
∂Q2
+
∂2C(Q)
∂Q2
!"≻ 0 . First, we assume that it is cheaper to 
get non-reusable e-waste than reusable e-waste because the former has less economic value. It 
means that the Right Hand Side (RHS) of equation (S.10) is very small. As environmental 
regulations are stringent in the North, dN is assumed to be high. Then, to have the equality in 
equation (S.10), the Left Hand Side (LHS) must also be small, and hence P0 must be negative. 
In this case, firms in the North are willing to pay firms in the South in order to dispose of the 
non-reusable e-waste. Note that their willingness to pay must not exceed the disposal cost 
they have to pay in their home country. Otherwise, it is better to dispose of it locally, and this 
will break down the non-reusable e-waste market that is a part of the alternative e-waste 
market. Likewise, this is not the general case.  
4.2. Demand side (Firm in the South) 
 (D.4)          
maxΠSIS = PX1 −P1X1 −P0X0 −CS (X1)− dSX0
X0,X1
 
The first order conditions with respect to X0 and X1 are given respectively by: 
(D.5)           
∂ΠSIS
∂X 0
= −P0 − dS
= 0 if P0 ≺ 0
≺ 0  otherwise
!
"
#
$#
             
 (D.6)        ∂Π
SI
S
∂X1
= P −P1 −
∂CS (X1)
∂X1
= 0  
We claim on the demand side, the following: 
Proposition 2: In the case of sorting investment, the price of the non-reusable e-waste should 
be ‘negative’; the firm in the South is willing to get compensation for disposal services. 
§ Proof of Proposition 2: 
From (D.6) we get that: 
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(D.7)            P =
∂CS (1,X1)
∂X1
+ P1  
This result is a perfect competition condition stating that the price must be equal to the 
marginal cost. The marginal cost has two components: the price of one unit of reusable e-
waste that is paid to the firm in the North and the marginal cost related to the repairing efforts. 
For a given price P in the South, we can deduce a demand function for the reusable e-waste as 
D1= D1(P1). We can check that D1 is indeed a demand function.  The derivative of (D.4) with 
respect to X is given by 
2
11
2
1 1
(1, ) 0SC XP
X X
∂∂
= − <
∂ ∂
. The demand of reusable e-waste exists as 
long as the resale price P of the reusable e-waste in the South is higher than the price P1 that is 
paid to the firm in the North. 
(D.5) leads to −P0 − dS
= 0 if P0 ≺ 0
≺ 0  otherwise
!
"
#
$#
 . 
In order to have an optimum demand of the non-reusable e-waste (X0), the condition 
(D.5) should be equal to zero. This means that the price of the non-reusable e-waste P0 should 
be negative. Hence, the necessary condition for firms in the South to trade in the presence of 
non-reusable e-waste is to be compensated. We can also deduce an implicit demand function 
D0= D0(P0). The compensating price P0 should at least be equal to the disposal cost in the 
South in order for firms there to trade.  
4.3. Market equilibrium 
By equalizing demand and supply (D0=S0 and D1=S1), we get in equilibrium the levels of 
trade X0* and X1*.  
From (S.9)-(D.6) and (S.10)-(D.5), we get the following equilibrium conditions: 
(E.3)          P = 1
α
* ∂C(Q)
∂Q
!
"
# +
∂CN (α,Q)
∂Q
!
"
#+
∂CS (1,X1)
∂X1  
and
 
(E.4)           dN − dS =
1
1−α
* ∂C(Q)
∂Q
!
"
# +
∂CN (α,Q)
∂Q
!
"
#.
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(E.3) states that the resale price of the reusable e-waste in the South should be equal to its 
marginal cost. The marginal cost is related to both firms in the North and in the South and to 
the sorting investment. From (E.4), we can deduce that at the equilibrium, the difference in 
environmental regulations (disposal cost) positively depends on the sum of the marginal 
sorting cost and the marginal cost of collecting in the North. The marginal sorting cost and the 
marginal cost of collecting in the North are assumed to be positive so that the disposal cost in 
the North  is always higher than that in the South.
 
5. No sorting investment vs sorting investment  
In this section, we compare results between the standard e-waste market and the alternative e-
waste market at the levels of supply and demand. 
5.1. Supply side  
In the supply side, we claim the following: 
Proposition 3: Imperfect information on the degree of purity without monitoring leads to a 
price of e-waste that lies between P0 and P1. 
Corollary 1: Imperfect information on the degree of purity without monitoring leads to less 
supply of the reusable e-waste and more supply of the non-reusable e-waste. 
Proposition 4: In the case of imperfect information on the degree of purity with perfect 
monitoring, only high marginal penalties can make the standard e-waste market less 
attractive. 
§ Proof of Proposition 3: 
Using (S.2) and (S.3), we can derive the implicit supply function Se=X(Pe). It can be shown 
that Se=X(Pe) is indeed a supply function using the following condition: 
∂Pe
∂X
=
∂Pe
∂Q
+
∂Pe
∂D
 with X= Q+D
        = σ
1−σ
* ∂
2F (Q,D)
∂D2
+
1
α!" + (1−σ )(1−α )!"
*
∂2CN (α,Q)
∂Q2
+σ
∂2F (Q,D)
∂Q2
!
"
#
#
$
%
&
&
≻ 0
.  
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In order to compare Pe, P1 and P0, we will consider two cases (σ=0 in the case of no 
monitoring, and σ=1 in the case of full monitoring). By assumption, the price that holds in the 
standard market is positive for the market to exist. Proposition 1 shows that the price of the 
non-reusable e-waste should be negative. This allows us to only compare the price in the 
standard market to the price of reusable e-waste in the alternative market.  
* No monitoring (σ=0) 
Using (S.2) and replacing σ=0, we get the following equations: 
Pe = ∂CN (α,Q)
∂Q
 and  P1 =
∂CN (α,Q)
∂Q
* 1
α
+
∂C(Q)
∂Q
* 1
α
. 
As α is lower than one, we can conclude that without the monitoring system, the price of 
the reusable e-waste in the alternative market is higher than the price in the standard market, 
because firms in the South will anticipate this and mix both types of e-waste. 
§ Proof of Corollary 1 
By using the properties of supply function, we can easily deduce that without monitoring, the 
supply in the reusable e-waste in the standard market is less than that of the alternative 
market. In fact, the price of the reusable e-waste in the alternative market is more attractive 
for the firm in the North. In the same way, the price of the non-reusable e-waste is less 
attractive in the alternative market and induces less supply of the non-reusable e-waste.  
§ Proof of Proposition 4: 
The full monitoring corresponds to the case of σ=1. 
* Full monitoring σ=1 
Likewise, replacing σ=1 into (S.2) leads to: 
Pe = 1
α
*
∂CN (α,Q)
∂Q
+
1
α
*∂F
∂Q
 and  P1 =
∂CN (α,Q)
∂Q
* 1
α
+
∂C(Q)
∂Q
* 1
α
. 
We can deduce the difference: 
Pe − P1 =
1
α
*( ∂F
∂Q
 -∂C(Q)
∂Q
) . 
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Depending on the difference between the marginal penalty and the marginal sorting 
cost, the price of the reusable e-waste in the alternative market can be higher or less than the 
price of e-waste in the standard market. If the marginal penalty is high, then firms in the 
North will have incentives to invest in sorting and to avoid mixing both types. As the 
alternative e-waste market will be full of suppliers, the consequence is that the price of 
reusable e-waste in the alternative market lowers. Therefore, the price of e-waste in the 
standard market increases because of the full monitoring and the high penalty. However, it 
makes the standard market less attractive. On contrary, if the marginal penalty is low, the 
collectors will not invest in sorting and will mix both types which will lower the price of e-
waste in the standard market and make it more attractive. We conclude that even with a 
perfect monitoring system, only a high marginal penalty can induce firms in the North to 
avoid mixing both types of e-waste.  
5.2. Demand side 
We claim the following: 
Proposition 5:  Under imperfect information, the price of e-waste in the standard e-waste 
market lies between P0 and P1. 
Corollary 2: Under imperfect information on the degree of purity, demand for the non-
reusable e-waste is less and demand for the reusable e-waste is high in the standard e-waste 
market. 
§ Proof of Proposition 5: 
As before, we can compare the price of e-waste in the standard market to the price of reusable 
e-waste in the alternative market. 
By using (D.2) and (D.6), we have:
  
Pe − P1 = −
(P + dS )(1−σ )(1− q)+σ (1− q)
∂CS
∂X
q+ (1−σ )(1− q)!" #$
≺ 0 with q ≤1; σ ≤1  
We conclude that whatever the condition is of the monitoring system, the firm in the 
South has a high willingness to pay for reusable e-waste in the alternative market than e-waste 
in the standard market. As the price of the non-reusable e-waste is negative (Proposition 2), 
we deduce that the price of e-waste in the standard e-waste market lies between P0 and P1.  
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§ Proof of Corollary 2 
 As the firm in the South has a high willingness to pay for the reusable e-waste in the 
alternative market than e-waste in the standard market, it will prefer more reusable e-
waste. Hence, demand in the non-reusable e-waste must be less, and demand in reusable 
e-waste must be high.  
6. Comparative statics on market equilibrium conditions 
In this section, we identify the effect of disposal costs, the difference in environmental 
regulations, the resale price of e-waste in the South, and the effect of the monitoring system 
on the equilibrium quantity and price in the alternative and standard e-waste markets. 
Proposition 6: 
We claim the following: 
Table 2: Comparative statics6 
 dX1 dX0 dX dP1 dP0 dPe 
dP + 0 + + 0 + 
dds 0 - - 0 - - 
ddN 0 + + 0 - - 
d(dN-dS) 0 + + 0 +/- +/- 
dσ 0 0 +/- 0 0 + 
 
See the proof of Proposition 6 in Appendix I. 
In the alternative e-waste market and according to Proposition 6, the level of trade in 
valuable e-waste (reusable) depends only on the resale price in the South. In fact, the main 
purpose of importing e-waste in developing countries is for re-use. Then, as long as the resale 
price is high in the South, the level of trade in reusable e-waste will increase at a high price. 
Disposal costs in the North and those in the South do not have any impact on either the price 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  dY	  is	  the	  differential	  of	  Y.	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or the level of trade in reusable e-waste. The fact that disposal costs essentially target non-
reusable e-waste may explain this. In fact, it is quite the reverse, as disposal costs have effects 
(positive or negative) on non-reusable e-waste. A stringent environmental regulation in the 
South will result in less trade in non-reusable e-waste, while a stringent environmental policy 
in the North leads to more trade in the non-reusable e-waste. This fact can explain the 
existence of ‘Pollution Havens Hypothesis’. Firms in the North may decide to escape the high 
disposal costs from their home country and ship the non-reusable e-waste to the South at a 
lower disposal cost. However, in the case where the South increases the disposal cost, 
shipping is no longer profitable for firms in the North. Therefore, the level of trade in the non-
reusable e-waste reduces. Additionally, the difference between environmental regulation in 
the North and the South has a positive effect on the trade of non-reusable e-waste. As long as 
the disposal cost is lower in South, it will be attractive for firms in the North to ship the non-
reusable e-waste. However, the difference in regulation has an undetermined qualitative effect 
(positive or negative) on the price of the non-reusable e-waste. Unsurprisingly, the difference 
affects neither the level of trade in the reusable e-waste nor its price.  
In the standard market, parameters have joint effects7 on the level of trade relative to 
the alternative e-waste market. The monitoring has a positive impact on the price of the e-
waste, and an undetermined effect on the level of trade in e-waste. This is surprising, because 
the monitoring is targeted to reduce the trade in e-waste. But, as the level of trade has two 
components (reusable and non-reusable e-waste), a high price will induce less non-reusable 
and more reusable e-waste. Hence, the level of trade will decrease or increase, depending on 
the difference between the decreasing rate in non-reusable e-waste and the increasing rate in 
reusable e-waste.  
7. Conclusion 
In this paper, we use a simple bilateral North-South trade model and show that there exists an 
alternative better than the standard e-waste market for developing countries. We propose an 
economic analysis of a standard e-waste market that we compare with an alternative market of 
a joint trade in reusable and non-reusable e-waste. We then show that firms in the North are 
willing to pay to get rid of their non-reusable e-waste while firms in the South are willing to 
get compensation for disposal services. Moreover, in the alternative market without a 
monitoring system, the quantity of non-valuable e-waste is lower than that of the standard 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  It	  is	  a	  combination	  of	  effects	  on	  both	  non-­‐reusable	  and	  reusable	  e-­‐waste.	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market at a higher price of reusable e-waste. Then, it can be a better option for firms in the 
South to adopt the alternative e-waste market, which results in more reusable e-waste and less 
non-reusable e-waste with compensation for disposal services. We also show that only a very 
high marginal penalty can constrain firms in the North from mixing both types of e-waste. 
Thus, it should be better to allow a legal e-waste trade together with an enforcement of an 
appropriate technology transfer for sustainable e-waste recycling technologies in developing 
countries, such as for pyrometallurgical methods and de-gassing CFC/HCFC. 
Another important issue is the implementation of this alternative market. Firms in 
developing countries need to induce firms in the North to invest in sorting and to truthfully 
reveal the degree of purity. This implementation issue requires incentives theory together with 
information gathering theory applied to the Principal-Agent framework, which is explored in 
Dato (2014). For the sake of simplicity, we neglect in this model factors such as the existence 
of new products in the South, importing firms for the purpose of recycling, market power to 
firms in the North, production process in North, etc. However, our model is still valid. In fact, 
in the South, the majority of new products do not last, and even if the price is low, consumers 
may doubt the quality and prefer second-hand products. The existence of new products may 
not alter the main results in this paper. The model is also still valid in the case where the e-
waste is imported for the purpose of recycling, but then the behaviour of firms in the South 
may change. This model needs to be empirically tested, and can be extended to empirically 
estimate the elasticity of e-waste demand and supply by using real data from the e-waste 
market. It could also help to identify the quantitative effects of taxes through the price, the 
monitoring system, and disposal costs on the demand, supply and the trade in e-waste. 
Experimental methods can also be useful to understand the strategic behaviour of collectors in 
the North and of firms in the South. 
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9. Appendix I 
Proof of proposition 6: 
The proof is divided into three cases. The first two cases are related to the alternative e-waste 
market while the last case concerns the standard e-waste market. 
Case 1: The reusable e-waste in the alternative e-waste market. 
We use the supply X1= S1(P1) and the demand X1=D1(P1,P) of the reusable e-waste to get the 
following system. 
X1 − S1(P1) = 0
X1 −D1(P1,P) = 0
"
#
$
%$  
• The effect of the disposal costs and the degree of monitoring.  
dX1
ddN
=
dX1
ddS
=
dX1
ddN − ddS
=
dX1
dσ
= 0 ,  as X1 is not a function of dN, dS and σ. 
Likewise, 
dP1
ddN
=
dP1
ddS
=
dP1
ddN − ddS
=
dP1
dσ
= 0 , as P1 is not a function of dN, dS and σ. 
• The effect of the resale price: (dX1/dP and dP1/dP) 
By taking the derivative of the system with respect to P, we get: 
dX1
dP
−
∂S1
∂P1
* dP1
dP
= 0
dX1
dP
−
∂D1
∂P1
* dP1
dP
−
dD1
dP
= 0
#
$
%
%
&
%
%
 
and in matrix term: 
 
1 −∂S1
∂P1
1 −∂D1
∂P1
#
$
%
%
%
%
%
&
'
(
(
(
(
(
*
dX1
dP
dP1
dP
#
$
%
%
%
%
&
'
(
(
(
(
=
0
dD1
dP
#
$
%
%%
&
'
(
((
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We can then calculate the Jacobian determinant as: 
            J =
1 −∂S1
∂P1
1 −∂D1
∂P1
= −
∂D1
∂P1
+
∂S1
∂P1
≻ 0
 
From the Jacobian determinant, we can deduce: 
dX1
dP
=
0 −∂S1
∂P1
dD1
dP
−
∂D1
∂P1
J
=
∂S1
∂P1
* dD1
dP
J
≻ 0 with dD1
dP
≻ 0 and ∂S1
∂P1
≻ 0
 
and  
dP1
dP
=
1 0
1 ∂D1
∂P
J
=
dD1
dP
J
≻ 0  
Case 2: The non-reusable e-waste in the alternative e-waste market 
We also use the supply X0= S0(P0) and the demand X0=D0(P0,P) of the non-reusable e-waste 
to get the following system. 
X 0 − S0 (P0 ,dN ) = 0
X 0 −D0 (P0 ,dS ) = 0
"
#
$
%$  
• The effect of the degree of monitoring and the resale price.  
As neither the quantity of the non-reusable e-waste nor its price is a function of P and σ, we 
get no effect as follows. 
dX 0
dP
=
dX 0
dσ
= 0  and dP0
dP
=
dP0
dσ
= 0  . 
• The effect of the disposal cost dS in the South. 
Taking the derivative of the system with respect to dS, we get: 
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dX 0
ddS
−
∂S0
∂P0
*
dP0
ddS
= 0
dX 0
ddS
−
∂D0
∂P0
*
dP0
ddS
−
dD0
ddS
= 0
#
$
%
%
&
%
%
 
In matrix form we have: 
 
1 −
∂S0
∂P0
1 −
∂D0
∂P0
#
$
%
%
%
%
%
&
'
(
(
(
(
(
*
dX 0
ddS
dP0
ddS
#
$
%
%
%
%%
&
'
(
(
(
((
=
0
dD0
ddS
#
$
%
%
%
&
'
(
(
(
 
and J =
1 −
∂S0
∂P0
1 −
∂D0
∂P0
= −
∂D0
∂P0
+
∂S0
∂P0
≻ 0  
Then we deduce: 
dX 0
ddS
=
0 −∂S0
∂P0
dD0
ddS
−
∂D0
∂P0
J
=
∂S0
∂P0
* dD0
ddS
J
≺ 0 with 
dD0
ddS
≺ 0 and 
∂S0
∂P0
≻ 0  
and  
dP0
ddS
=
1 0
1 dD0
ddS
J
=
dD0
ddS
J
≺ 0  
• The effect of the disposal cost dN in the North. 
The derivative of the system with respect to dN gives:  
dX 0
ddN
−
∂S0
∂P0
*
dP0
ddN
−
dS0
ddN
= 0
dX 0
ddN
−
∂D0
∂P0
*
dP0
ddN
= 0
#
$
%
%
&
%
%
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In matrix form we have: 
 
1 −
∂S0
∂P0
1 −
∂D0
∂P0
#
$
%
%
%
%
%
&
'
(
(
(
(
(
*
dX 0
ddN
dP0
ddN
#
$
%
%
%
%%
&
'
(
(
(
((
=
dS0
ddN
0
#
$
%
%
%
&
'
(
(
(
and J =
1 −
∂S0
∂P0
1 −
∂D0
∂P0
= −
∂D0
∂P0
+
∂S0
∂P0
≻ 0
 
We deduce that:
 
dX 0
ddN
=
dS0
ddN
−
∂S0
∂P0
0 −∂D0
∂P0
J
=
−
dS0
ddN
* ∂D0
∂P0
J
≻ 0 with 
dS0
ddN
≻ 0 and 
∂D0
∂P0
≺ 0  
and 
dP0
ddN
=
1 dS0
ddN
1 0
J
=
−
dS0
ddN
J
≺ 0  
• The effect of the difference in the disposal costs between the North and the South (dN-
dS=b) 
The effect on the quantity of the non-reusable e-waste is calculated as follows. 
dX 0
db
=
dX 0
ddS
*
∂dS
∂b
+
dX 0
ddN
*
∂dN
∂b
=-
dX 0
ddS
+
dX 0
ddN
        = -
∂S0
∂P0
* dD0
ddS
J
−
dS0
ddN
* ∂D0
∂P0
J
≻ 0
 
We also determine the effect on the price of the non-reusable e-waste. 
dP0
db
=
dP0
ddS
*
∂dS
∂b
+
dP0
ddN
*
∂dN
∂b
      
=-
dP0
ddS
+
dP0
ddN
≻ 0 if 
dP0
ddN
≻
dP0
ddS
≺ 0 otherwise
!
"
#
$
#
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Case 3: The standard e-waste market 
In the case of a standard e-waste market, we consider the supply X= Se(Pe,dN,σ) and the 
demand X=De(Pe,P, dS,σ) of e-waste that leads to the following system. 
Xe − Se (Pe ,dN ,σ ) = 0
Xe −De (Pe ,P,σ ,dS ) = 0
"
#
$
%$  
• The effect of the resale price P 
* 0
* 0
e e e
e
e e e e
e
dX S dP
dP P dP
dX D dP dD
dP P dP dP
∂⎧
− =⎪ ∂⎪
⎨
∂⎪ − − =
⎪ ∂⎩
 
 In matrix form:  
1 0
*
1
e e
e
e
e e
e
S dX
P dP
dDD dP
dPP dP
∂⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞− ⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟∂ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ =⎜ ⎟
⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟∂ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟− ⎜ ⎟ ⎝ ⎠⎜ ⎟∂ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
and J =
1 −
∂Se
∂Pe
1 −
∂De
∂Pe
= −
∂De
∂Pe
+
∂Se
∂Pe
≻ 0
 
We deduce : 
dXe
dP
=
0 −∂Se
∂Pe
dDe
dP
−
∂De
∂Pe
J
=
∂Se
∂Pe
* dDe
dP
J
≻ 0 with 
dDe
dP
≻ 0 and 
∂Se
∂Pe
≻ 0
 
and 
dPe
dP
=
1 0
1 ∂De
∂P
J
=
dDe
dP
J
≻ 0 
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• The effect of the disposal cost dN in the North. 
* 0
* 0
e e e e
N e N N
e e e
N e N
dX S dP dS
dd P dd dd
dX D dP
dd P dd
∂⎧
− − =⎪ ∂⎪
⎨
∂⎪ − =
⎪ ∂⎩
 
In matrix form :  
1
*
1 0
e e
e
e N
N
e e
e N
S dX
dS
P dd
dd
D dP
P dd
∂⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞
− ⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟∂ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ = ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟∂ ⎜ ⎟−⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎝ ⎠∂⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
 and J =
1 −
∂Se
∂Pe
1 −
∂De
∂Pe
= −
∂De
∂Pe
+
∂Se
∂Pe
≻ 0
 
We determine: 
dXe
ddN
=
dSe
ddN
−
∂Se
∂Pe
0 −∂De
∂Pe
J
=
−
dSe
ddN
* ∂De
∂Pe
J
≻ 0 with 
dSe
ddN
≻ 0 and 
∂De
∂Pe
≺ 0
 
and 
 
dPe
ddN
=
1 dSe
ddN
1 0
J
=
−
dSe
ddN
J
≺ 0  
•  The effect of the disposal cost dS in the South. 
* 0
* 0
e e e
S e S
e e e e
S e S S
dX S dP
dd P dd
dX D dP dD
dd P dd dd
∂⎧
− =⎪ ∂⎪
⎨
∂⎪ − − =
⎪ ∂⎩  
In the matrix form : 
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1 0
*
1
e e
e S
e
e e
S
e S
S dX
P dd
dD
D dP
dd
P dd
∂⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞
− ⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟∂ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ = ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟∂ ⎜ ⎟−⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎝ ⎠∂⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠  
and the Jaconbian determinant is :
 
J =
1 −
∂Se
∂Pe
1 −
∂De
∂Pe
= −
∂De
∂Pe
+
∂Se
∂Pe
≻ 0
 
We deduce that : 
dXe
ddS
=
0 −∂Se
∂Pe
dDe
ddS
−
∂De
∂Pe
J
=
∂Se
∂Pe
* dDe
ddS
J
≺ 0 with 
dDe
ddS
≺ 0 and 
∂Se
∂Pe
≻ 0
 
and 
 
dPe
ddS
=
1 0
1 dDe
ddS
J
=
dDe
ddS
J
≺ 0  
• The effect of the difference in the disposal costs between the North and the South (dN-
dS=b) 
We determine the effect on the quantity of e-waste as: 
* *e e S e N
S N
dX dX d dX d
db dd b dd b
∂ ∂
= +
∂ ∂
 
   =- e e
S N
dX dX
dd dd
+ = -
∂Se
∂Pe
* dDe
ddS
J
−
dSe
ddN
* ∂De
∂Pe
J
≻ 0  
The effect on the price of e-waste is: 
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dPe
db
=
dPe
ddS
*
∂dS
∂b
+
dPe
ddN
*
∂dN
∂b
=-
dPe
ddS
+
dPe
ddN
≻ 0 if 
dPe
ddN
≻
dPe
ddS
≺ 0 otherwise
"
#
$
%
$
     
• The effect of the degree of the monitoring σ 
The derivative of the system gives: 
* 0
* 0
e e e e
e
e e e e
e
dX S dP dS
d P d d
dX D dP dD
d P d d
σ σ σ
σ σ σ
∂⎧
− − =⎪ ∂⎪
⎨
∂⎪ − − =
⎪ ∂⎩
 
 
In matrix form :  
1
*
1
e e e
e
e e e
e
S dX dS
P d d
D dP dD
P d d
σ σ
σ σ
∂⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞−⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟∂⎜ ⎟ =⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟
⎜ ⎟∂ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟− ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟∂ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
 and J =
1 −
∂Se
∂Pe
1 −
∂De
∂Pe
= −
∂De
∂Pe
+
∂Se
∂Pe
≻ 0
 
We deduce that : 
* *
 
e e
e
e e e e e e
ee e e
dS S
d P
dD D dS D S dD
d PdX d P P d
d J J
σ
σ σ σ
σ
∂
−
∂
∂ ∂ ∂− − +
∂ ∂ ∂
= =  
with 
dDe
dσ
≻ 0 , 
∂Se
∂Pe
≻ 0,
∂De
∂Pe
≺ 0 and 
dSe
dσ
≺ 0 ( dD
dσ
≺ 0; dQ
dσ
) 
 ; 
 
dXe
dσ
≺ 0
≻ 0
!
"
#  
and 
 
dPe
dσ
=
1 dSe
dσ
1 dDe
dσ
J
=
dDe
dσ
−
dSe
dσ
J
≻ 0  
